

Public consultation - suitability test on the security of energy supply

Catalogue of questions from the European Commission

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1. Introduction

The EU has a comprehensive energy security framework, with the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 and Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation (EU) 2019/941 as key pillars. Since their adoption in 2017 and 2019 respectively, sufficient time has passed **to perform an evaluation (fitness check)** to identify synergies within the framework and structurally internalise lessons learned from the COVID-19 and energy crises, as well as to prepare for the changing landscape due to the energy transition and Europe's phase out of Russian energy imports' dependency.

The objective of this evaluation is to evaluate the functioning of the energy security regulations, against 5 criteria:

- **Effectiveness** (how successful were the regulations in achieving its objective of ensuring preparedness, security of supply and resilience of the EU's energy system?)
- **Efficiency** (how efficient were the regulations, e.g. in terms of financial and human resources used for the changes generated by the previously mentioned regulations?)
- **Relevance** (how have the scope and objectives of the regulations remained relevant in addressing the past and current problems across the implementation period from 2017 and 2019 until now? Are they relevant in addressing future needs and problems?)
- **Coherence** (how well did the regulations work with other policy interventions and how well did specific measures in the regulations work together?)
- **EU Added Value** (to what extent did the regulations better reach the objectives, compared to what could have been reasonably expected from regional, national or local actions?)

Through this evaluation, the Commission aims at **assessing the performance of the EU's energy security framework during the energy crisis and during the energy transition**, and identify possible deficiencies, as well as synergies and efficiency gains. This could benefit the ongoing sectoral integration, as well as reduce administrative burden. The assessment will also look at how the cooperation with neighbours worked, in particular with Energy Community contracting parties.

Besides evaluating how the EU's energy security framework functioned in the past, this questionnaire **looks at the future** by considering the dynamic changes ongoing in the EU's energy landscape, such as new challenges brought by diversification of gas suppliers to non-Russian suppliers, decarbonisation, climate change adaptation and electrification.

This public consultation is structured in **two main sections**: one section with **general questions on energy security** for all respondents, and a **second section with more specific and technical questions**. The section with specific questions is divided into three subsections: (1) on the whole energy security framework, (2) on security of gas supply, and (3) on security of electricity supply. Respondents may choose to answer those subsections of the questionnaire that are of interest to them.

2. General questions on the security of energy supply

Energy security is the ability of an economy to ensure the balance between energy supply and energy needs across different timeframes and the ability of the system to react to sudden shocks (resilience) supported by the underlying energy infrastructure. Energy security also has a strong international dimension, given that the EU depends on energy imports from third countries.

While the fundamentals are well-functioning and well-interconnected energy markets and energy efficiency efforts, the EU has also developed a robust energy security framework relying on: oil emergency stocks, gas security of supply and storage, electricity risk-preparedness, offshore safety, critical infrastructure protection, and cybersecurity.

The energy crisis caused by Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine has shown how external energy dependencies of the EU can be weaponized. It was a stark reminder of how energy security is a key building block of a resilient, future-proof and competitive economy.

Besides, decarbonisation and electrification will bring new energy security challenges. Increasing energy system integration increases the risk of cascading cross-sectoral failures, in particular between gas and electricity sectors. In 2023, natural gas notably accounted for around 15 % of EU electricity generation, while in the future substantial volumes of electricity will be required for the production of hydrogen through electrolysis.

This section aims at collecting feedback regarding the functioning of the current EU energy security framework, and its possible future evolution.

21 How well do you think the current EU framework for energy security works?

The EU architecture and regulatory framework for energy security have proven to be good and efficient in principle. In the future, gradual adjustments will be necessary, which should be made step by step in line with the changing supply situations in the course of the transformation. The legal framework should take a more holistic approach, especially with increasing sector coupling. The mix of different energy sources is of paramount importance for the resilience of the energy supply in the European Union.

The expansion of controllable systems for the electricity sector, e.g. power plants and batteries, is the greatest challenge for the security of supply of the electricity sector. This must be prioritised, for example through the introduction of capacity markets and the power plant strategy in Germany.

To ensure the security of supply remains guaranteed, the corresponding infrastructure must be maintained or developed. This requires an investment-friendly framework.

22 Please explain your choice:

23 In your opinion, which of the following objectives are most important for the EU architecture of energy security?

1 to 5 answers

- Energy load control and reduction
- Fair distribution of the costs of energy supply security
- Prevention (risk assessment and anchoring of emergency plans)
- Resilience of the energy infrastructure, e.g. to climate change
- Optimum utilisation of the existing infrastructure
- Physical protection of critical energy infrastructures against man-made attacks
- Security of energy-related supply chains
- Cyber security
- Expansion of interconnections and smarter infrastructure between Member States
- Diversification of energy sources, suppliers and supply routes
- Increased use of energy storage (electricity, gas,
- Liquid fuels, heat) for the security of energy supply
- Investments in domestic decarbonised energy systems
- Withdrawal from Russian fossil fuel supplies

24 Please explain your choice:

The focus of the response is on objectives for which legal regulations at EU level (framework, not detailed organisation) are necessary or helpful. For example, cyber security is considered to be very important for security of supply; however, there is no need for further energy-specific regulations at EU level.

In the opinion of BDEW, the point "Optimal utilisation of the existing infrastructure" also includes the adaptation of the infrastructure to RE as well as the expansion of interconnectors and intelligent infrastructure in the national and cross-border area.

25 In your opinion, what impact has electrification already had and how can it further impact the EU's energy security in the medium term? Has the EU energy security framework been sufficient to address these impacts and, if not, what improvements do you think are needed?

Electrification is one of the cornerstones of energy security, but the benefits will not materialise without the ability to store and transport energy in large quantities. In terms of efficiency, the well-developed gas infrastructure, including the market, should be utilised to transport energy across Europe. This implies long-term and very high investments in the reorganisation and development of the infrastructure.

The ongoing expansion of renewable energy sources leads to a reduction in (mostly imported) fossil fuels and thus contributes to the security of energy supply.

The challenges of the energy transition are highly dynamic. A paradigm shift is taking place: generation is becoming less flexible, while loads are not only increasing, but must also become more flexible. Markets, technologies and the behaviour of those involved must be adapted. Challenges arise in the areas of operational stability of the grids, availability of flexibility-creating technologies (centralised and decentralised) and bottlenecks in the supply chains, regulation and work for the development of additional renewable energy sources and transport infrastructure. In addition, increasing electrification and associated technology choices (including private applications such as electric vehicles and smart metering systems) increase the number and type of threat vectors (e.g. cyber threats) if the associated risks are not carefully managed.

In the medium term - in a phase full of changes and inefficiencies - the vulnerability is estimated to be much higher than in the long term, when the transition phase ends and a more stable phase sets in.

In principle, the EU architecture and regulations on energy security are suitable for accommodating these developments.

26 Are there risks to the security of energy supply in connection with possible future electricity imports from third countries?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

27 To what extent are there risks to the security of energy supply in connection with possible future electricity imports from third countries?

Geopolitical risks, environmental risks, supply risks.

The risks to the security of energy supply associated with potential future electricity imports from third countries include firstly the increased use of interconnectors. Secondly, any disruption to a third country's energy supply could significantly affect the EU's security of energy supply, especially if the country is a major supplier. It is also possible that

unforeseen events, such as power plant outages on the grid, could further exacerbate these risks.

However, cooperation within Europe and the exchange of electricity help to strengthen the European network. An illustrative example of this is the cooperation within the PI-CASSO project.

28 Are there improvements to the EU energy security of supply framework that are needed to support the ongoing transition (e.g. to a more electrified, renewable-based and integrated EU energy system)?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

29 Can you provide more details?

Adjustments in the sense of optimisation in line with changes in the supply situation; in the long term, the requirements may be reduced, for example for protected gas customers.

30 What role can decarbonised and renewable hydrogen, including in the form of liquid fuel, play in the EU's future energy security?

With an increasing share of renewable energies in the electricity grid and the progressive electrification of other sectors, there is also a growing need for flexibility to secure the electricity supply when the sun is not shining and the wind is not blowing. In addition to hydrogen-capable gas-fired power plants, hydrogen storage systems also have an important role to play here.

In Germany, for example, the power plant strategy and the Power Plant Safety Act are of particular importance.

31 What are the potential risks to the security of hydrogen supply and to what extent should they be mitigated? How do you see the future role of hydrogen imports? Should the EU energy security framework play a role?

The EU is only at the very beginning of a hydrogen supply. In the long term, the EU will be dependent on imports of H₂. Therefore, diversified supply sources and sufficient storage capacities should be aimed for. In order to make it from the initial and start-up phase to the ramp-up phase, the ramp-up of the European hydrogen industry must not be hindered by restrictive regulatory requirements. A pragmatic approach is needed along the entire value chain for low-carbon hydrogen, which must also be reflected in the next step in the existing Delegated Act on the production of renewable hydrogen (DA 2023/1184). This should therefore be reviewed and adapted well before 2028, or by 2026 at the latest. This is an important step towards achieving the quantities of

hydrogen required for decarbonisation. A narrow version of the criteria, right from the start, stands in the way of the ramp-up of the hydrogen economy.

It should also be noted that the H2 ramp-up is linked to the development of natural gas consumption.

An "H2-SoS-VO" is not necessary, at least in the short to medium term. On the contrary, it would increase costs even further and thus hinder the H2 ramp-up. In addition, the customer structure should not make this necessary initially. A SoS regulation should not be created before the market has even arrived.

32 Do you think that the current EU energy security of supply framework takes sufficient account of climate risks, such as disruptions to energy supply due to heat and drought or damage to energy infrastructure as a result of extreme weather events?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

33 Please give specific examples and/or suggestions as to how this can be achieved.

On the one hand, the objectives at EU level should not be mixed up while on the other hand, regulations already exist at national level, for example on physical resilience, e.g. floods, wherefore there is no need for further regulation at EU level in this regard.

34 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) has become an increasingly important source of gas supply (currently accounting for around 50% of EU imports). Do you see any risks associated with the increasing dependence on the global LNG market?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

35 In your opinion, what are the specific risks (e.g. dependence on unstable democratic countries, exposure to fluctuations on the stock markets global markets, bottlenecks or oversized infrastructure, etc.)? How should these be reduced?

There is a fundamental risk of disruptions in global supply chains.

A well-developed infrastructure is therefore required to be able to cover peak demand, as well as a good diversification of suppliers and sources of supply. As long as the global gas market functions, there is no supply risk.

Around 50% of European LNG imports currently come from the USA, whereas in Germany the US accounts for around 80%. No substantial growth in supply on the global LNG market is expected before 2027. Europe is therefore in direct competition with Asian LNG importers. Strong economic development, a cold winter in the northern hemisphere or disruptions to LNG production due to natural disasters can therefore only be offset to a limited extent by increases in LNG supply. The price volatility of LNG will therefore remain high in the medium term.

36 Are there specific energy security measures in other countries (USA, China, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, UK, etc.) that should also be included in the EU framework?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

37 What measures do you think would be useful?

38 Do you consider increased international cooperation with close partners to be useful for the EU's energy security?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

39 Please elaborate if necessary:

In principle, increased international cooperation can contribute to the diversification of H2 and LNG imports.

40 What is the added value of EU regulation for the EU's security of energy supply compared to what could realistically (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) have been achieved by Member States at national level?

It is important and appropriate to set the framework at EU level, to define minimum requirements for Member States and to monitor their compliance, but the detailed design and legal implementation should be left to the Member States.

41 Have recent developments, such as the increasing importance of LNG, improved cross-border infrastructure and the joint phase-out of Russian gas, made action and coordination at EU level more or less important for the security of energy supply?

- More important
 - Just as important
-

- Less important
- No opinion

42 Please elaborate:

Action at EU level has been very important since the day we started importing the majority of our energy needs. Now that the source of these imports is changing, they remain just as important.

43 Does EU energy security policy respond to the needs of EU citizens and/or businesses (e.g. in terms of availability and affordability of energy, etc.)? Will it continue to be relevant to them over the next ten years?

Yes, the EU energy security policy has taken into account the needs of EU citizens by focussing on energy availability and crisis management. Affordability and other needs are addressed in other policy initiatives.

44 The European Commission's Joint Research Centre has identified [14 megatrends](#) (see figure below), which are long-term factors that will most likely have a global impact in the future. Which of these megatrends do you think the EU architecture for energy security is least prepared for and why? Please explain.

The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as storms, floods and heatwaves are direct consequences of climate change, but their long-term prediction remains uncertain. While such events used to be rare, their increasing frequency poses a significant risk to the reliability of power grids and energy infrastructures. The EU energy security framework should take greater account of the scale and unpredictability of these extreme weather phenomena, for example in risk assessments and prevention plans.

45 Would you like to add anything about the general functioning and/or future direction of EU energy security policy?

46 Are there any documents, reports or other documents that you would like to upload?

3. Specific questions on the framework for the security of energy supply

47 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? "Measures at EU level have..."

	1	2	3	4	5
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	(Do not agree at all)	(Disagree)	(I am undecided)	(Agree)	(Totally agree)
... advantages for provision and security of supply in the energy sector"	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
... improves coordination and transparency between the Member States"	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
... market distortions and spillover effects in neighbouring countries reduced"	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

48 In recent years, have you identified any inconsistencies or regulatory gaps between the Ordinance on Secure Gas Supply and Storage and the Ordinance on Risk Prevention in the Electricity Sector that hinder the achievement of the respective objectives of these ordinances?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

49 How could the coherence between the aforementioned regulations be improved in the future and the regulatory gaps identified be eliminated?

50 Does your industry or country have strategies in place to mitigate the impact of an electricity supply crisis on gas supply and vice versa?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

51 Please explain the existing strategies in more detail:

In Germany, there are legal regulations that prioritise systemically relevant gas-fired power plants in the event of a gas crisis in order to prevent a spillover to the electricity sector.

52 Are the roles and responsibilities and the mechanisms for coordination between the electricity and natural gas sectors really effective in times of crisis?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

53 Why are they not effective?

54 The electricity and gas markets are increasingly interlinked. Do you see the following areas as potential areas where regulatory synergies could be sought?

	Yes	No	No opinion
Risk assessments and scenarios	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prevention/risk prevention plans	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Definitions and extent of crises	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis management procedures	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protected customers/special protection against disconnection from the grid	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Storage measures to ensure the security of energy supply (electricity, gases, liquid fuels, heat)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regional co-operation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solidarity/support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

55 Please elaborate if necessary:

In most of the areas mentioned, no adjustments to EU regulations are necessary. The interconnection between the gas and electricity markets should rather take place in the national implementation and by the respective competent authorities. Moreover, this approach allows the respective national circumstances to be taken into account, including the structure and organisation of the competent authorities.

A good example is integrated network planning.

56 Are there other areas not mentioned in the table above in which synergy effects should be sought?

57 In your opinion, are there reasons and opportunities to harmonise the security of energy supply frameworks for gas storage and energy storage in the broader sense more closely?

Yes

No

58 Can you give specific examples?

As sector coupling and the ramp-up of the H2 economy progress, the importance of energy storage is increasing. Underground gas and hydrogen storage facilities play a special role here as the physical, large-volume source of flexibility.

At the present time and in the medium term, however, harmonisation is neither appropriate nor sensible. A legal framework that currently exists for individual commodities and takes their specifics into account cannot simply be rolled out across the board.

Further development of the legal framework is conceivable in the future.

59 What are the main cross-sectoral or cascading risks for gas and electricity that should be addressed in the future (e.g. shortages of critical gas volumes for power generation, power outages of turbines in the gas system/boilers or power outages affecting renewable/low-carbon gas generation)?

Interruptions to the gas supply affect electricity generation

60 How could these risks be eliminated in future?

Gas supplies to electricity generation plants should be prioritised to the extent that they are necessary to protect the integrity of the electricity grid (cf. concept of system-relevant gas-fired power plants in Germany). This would also take into account the fact that today's protected gas customers will need more electricity for their heat supply in the future. In addition, there is a fundamental interaction due to the electricity requirements of heating systems, for example.

61 Are the risks associated with the further digitalisation and smarter design of energy networks, i.e. cybersecurity risks, adequately addressed in terms of ensuring security of supply? In your opinion, is there a need to improve the EU energy security framework to prevent these risks?

Managing these risks is a priority for energy companies. There is no need for further regulations at European level.

62 Do you think it is possible that demand-side measures will play an additional or stronger role in the future EU architecture for security of energy supply alongside the existing framework in the recently adopted electricity market design?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

63 Can you give specific examples that would make it possible to better identify and mobilise demand-side measures?

Flexibility on the demand side should be utilised within the existing market framework. Additional instruments would fragment this and lead to distortions.

64 Please explain:

65 Are there any records, reports or other documents on these aspects that you would like to upload?

4. Specific question on the security of gas supply

Security of gas supply is the ability of the gas system to guarantee the supply of gas to customers at a clearly defined level of performance. Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 on security of gas supply, which was amended in 2022 by the Gas Storage Regulation and the Gas Package adopted in 2024, introduced security measures at EU level. It is based on the following points:

- Improving the exchange of information and transparency, e.g. via the "Gas" coordination group.
- EU-wide simulations and risk assessments at European, regional and national level.
- A framework for national prevention plans and contingency plans to prevent and respond to risks and crises.
- Crisis management procedures and solidarity measures in emergencies, especially for "protected customers" (e.g. private households).
- A strategy to ensure the filling of gas storage facilities.

On 5 October 2023, the Commission published a report on the review of the Regulation (COM(2023) 572). Following the recent amendments, the Commission must prepare a report on the implementation of the storage provisions and the solidarity provisions of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package by 28 February 2025. This public consultation will not only feed into the fitness check of the security of energy supply framework, but also provide input to this report.

A. Review

1. Effectiveness

66 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 pursues several objectives. How do you rate its performance in relation to the following objectives?

	1 (Very bad)	2 (Bad)	3 (Average)	4 (Good)	5 (Excellent)
Ensure an adequate level of preparedness in Europe with regard to gas supply disruptions, e.g. by assessing risks and creating adequate infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ensuring the initiation of all necessary measures to guarantee a continuous gas supply, especially for protected customers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strengthening regional and EU-wide cooperation, including in supply emergencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

67 Have you encountered any obstacles or difficulties in implementing and enforcing the provisions of the regulation?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

68 Which provisions were difficult to implement and why?

Gaps became apparent in some parts in 2022/23. This concerns, for example, the prevention plans and emergency plans. Most Member States have not yet concluded any bilateral solidarity agreements.

The filling level requirements for gas storage facilities had to be implemented at very short notice and under challenging conditions in 2022, which limited the scope for implementation.

69 Have there been any unexpected and/or unintended consequences of the implementation of this Regulation that have hindered the realisation of these objectives?

- Yes

No

No opinion

70 What were the effects and which provisions of the regulation caused these effects?

In Germany, the achievement of the minimum gas storage levels in combination with the specified filling instruments has contributed to an improvement in the supply situation. The filling level requirements for gas storage facilities had to be implemented at very short notice and under challenging conditions in 2022, which limited the scope for implementation and led to high costs for filling and the associated levies.

71 How would you rate the effectiveness of the following specific provisions in ensuring preparedness, security of supply and/or resilience?

	1 (Completely ineffective)	2 (Hardly effective)	3 (Conditionally effective)	4 (Effective)	5 (Very effective)
Gas" coordination group	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Infrastructure standard and bidirectional capacities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Supply standard and protected customers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Joint risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prevention plans and emergency plans	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis levels	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solidarity provisions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Requirements for the exchange of information under Article 14	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Storage targets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Annual storage paths defined by the Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Certification of the operator of a storage facility	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Demand reduction and EU alarm	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cooperation with the contracting parties of the Energy Community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

72 Would you like to elaborate on one or more of the above points? If yes, please indicate which points you are referring to.

73 In your opinion, what are the main strengths and weaknesses of the Storage Ordinance, particularly with regard to the storage targets of 90 %, the target paths, the burden sharing, the certification procedure and the expiry clause of the storage provisions in 2025?

The goal of filling the storage facility was achieved. This was an important contribution to maintaining the desired level of supply security.

However, this is a major intervention in the market and very detailed requirements that were quickly introduced in a crisis. In this respect, it is right that the regulation is limited in time. It needs to be carefully evaluated and - if, for example, fill level targets are also to be set in the future - the regulations that lead to disproportionate burdens need to be streamlined. This applies, for example, to interim targets and certification. For example, the certification requirements lead to enormous bureaucratic demands with high costs.

Instead of a rigid filling level target at EU level, it would make sense, for example, to specify cornerstones for the methodology for individual Member States. BDEW would be happy to contribute to the development of such a methodology. The specific regulations should be issued by the Member States and reported to the EU.

Kommentiert [BL1]: The BDEW?

2. Efficiency

74 What were the costs and benefits of implementing the Secure Gas Supply Regulation in your organisation (including the storage and solidarity changes introduced by the Storage Regulation and the hydrogen and decarbonised gas market package)? If possible, please indicate both quantitative and qualitative elements.

Disadvantages: State gas procurement in connection with national storage filling has cost around €6 billion in Germany since 2022, which is ultimately to be borne by end consumers via a levy system. However, these costs are largely attributable to the special situation in 2022 and not 1:1 to the EU requirements, i.e. past costs are not a reliable indicator for the future.

In addition, many of the requirements lead to high bureaucratic costs.

Advantages: At the beginning of the winter of 2022/23, the gas storage facilities had high filling levels, which was good for security of supply. Another positive aspect is that a backup mechanism was established via the storage targets, which ensures security of supply if the storage facilities are not filled to a sufficient extent based on market signals.

75 To what extent have the following provisions caused a disproportionate effort (e.g. administrative, financial or other burdens)?

	1 (Negligible)	2 (Hardly)	3 (Average)	4 (Stark)	5 (Very strong)
Gas" coordination group	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Infrastructure standard and bidirectional capacities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Supply standard and protected customers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Joint risk assessments	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National risk assessments	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Prevention plans and emergency plans	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Crisis levels	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solidarity provisions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Requirements for the exchange of information under Article 14	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Storage targets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Annual storage paths defined by the Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Certification of the operator of a storage facility	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Demand reduction and EU alert	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cooperation with the contracting parties of the Energy Community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

76 Would you like to elaborate on one or more of the above points? If yes, please indicate which points you are referring to.

On the storage targets: effective, but only possible at great financial expense in 2022 due to the very short-term national implementation and process requirements.

77 How can the reporting and monitoring obligations of the Regulation be simplified? Have unnecessary duplication or overlapping responsibilities (e.g. in relation to risk assessments and plans) been avoided in relation to the current reporting and monitoring obligations or their frequency?

Article 14 reporting is somewhat unclear and it is unclear if/how this information will be used. Perhaps this could be deleted.

3. Relevance

78 To what extent have the provisions of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation been relevant in addressing the challenges and disruptions to gas supply that the EU has experienced since its implementation? Please elaborate on your answer, e.g. by explicitly referring to the 2022/2023 energy crisis.

The requirements of the Gas SoS Regulation, such as the emergency plan, crisis team, etc., contributed greatly to ensuring that the Member States were prepared and that at least the basic principles of crisis management were described and could be quickly put in place. The standardised definition of crisis levels was helpful in categorising the situation.

The "Natural Gas" coordination group successfully fulfilled its task and was very important for the exchange of information and cross-border coordination.

The minimum fill levels of the gas storage facilities were very important in 2022.

79 How well is the Security of Gas Supply Regulation adapted to technological or scientific progress and to the environmental/climate challenges facing the EU?

This is not the case. Therefore, the EU framework for gas supply should focus on its core objective: security of gas supply. Other objectives (decarbonisation, industrial policy, etc.) should instead be pursued in other initiatives and with other instruments.

4. Coherence

80 To what extent is the Regulation on security of gas supply harmonised with other EU policy objectives?

The Gas SoS Regulation contributes directly to the political goal of security of supply. It only contributes indirectly to competitiveness and has no relation to decarbonisation.

Mixing the various objectives within the Gas SoS Regulation would entail the risk that none of these objectives would be achieved.

81 Have some provisions of the Regulation proved to be incompatible?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

82 Please give specific examples:

5 European added value

83 In the Commission's 2016 proposal for the Regulation on security of gas supply, the need for EU action was justified as follows:

- "The increasing interdependence of the EU gas markets and the "corridor approach" to enable reverse flows in gas interconnectors require coordinated measures";
- "Without such coordination, it is likely that security of supply measures taken at national level will affect other Member States or security of supply at EU level";
- "In the event of a serious disruption to gas supplies to the EU, the threat does not stop at national borders; rather, several Member States may be directly or indirectly affected."
- "A national approach leads to sub-optimal measures and exacerbates the consequences of a crisis."

In your opinion, have the events of recent years (in particular the 2022/2023 energy crisis and the increasing importance of LNG as an alternative to Russian gas) confirmed these statements?

- Yes
 No
 No opinion

84 Can you please explain in more detail why you think these events have confirmed these statements?

85 Can you please explain in more detail why you think these events invalidate these statements?

B. Outlook

86 According to the impact assessment on the [2040 targets](#), demand for natural gas in the EU is expected to fall from around 319 Mtoe at present to 100-150 Mtoe in 2040, with biomethane production increasing. The overall decline in gas consumption may lead to a change in consumption behaviour, whereby the phase-out will probably take place at different speeds in the individual sectors. What changes should be made to the Security of Gas Supply Regulation to ensure it remains relevant in light of the likely evolution of gas supply and demand in the EU?

The EU Gas SoS Regulation is designed in such a way that it adapts to different needs. For example, if gas consumption changes, the volume of "protected" demand will automatically adjust.

87 Are there any targets for the security of gas supply that were not taken into account in 2017 and that a possible revision of the regulation should work towards achieving?

Yes

No

No opinion

88 What gaps in the current regulation do you think should be closed in a future update of the security of energy supply framework?

89 Some provisions expire in 2025, including the storage target of 90 %. In your opinion, what role should gas storage policy play in the short and long term after 2025?

In principle, the specification of a fill level target at EU level for all Member States in 2022 appears reasonable against the background of the crisis in 2022.

However, if such a legal regulation continues to exist at EU level beyond 2025, the requirements would have to be more flexible. Instead of a rigid filling level target, it would make sense for individual Member States to specify cornerstones for the methodology - which could include corridors, consideration of solidarity aspects, etc. BDEW would be happy to contribute to the development of such a methodology. The specific regulations should be issued by the Member States and reported to the EU. In this way, the respective supply situations and their developments can also be adequately considered.

Preference should be given to market-based instruments. Interventions that reduce the storage value, such as UIOLI, should be excluded.

Member States that have ensured security of supply, in particular through high storage levels (especially in relation to national gas consumption), should not have to bear the

costs of these solidarity measures alone, but should also be allowed to share the costs of security of supply.

90 Should a revision of the Regulation provide for more transparency in long-term gas contracts, e.g. via Article 14, in particular where a single supplier from a third country has a significant share in the overall supply mix?

Yes

No

No opinion

91 How should the regulation ensure greater transparency?

92 Why should the regulation not focus on greater transparency?

The market is already very transparent.

93 How should the costs of maintaining a high level of gas supply security be distributed among different stakeholders such as companies, citizens and governments?

Ultimately, the costs are borne by the consumer. Even if the costs are passed on to other stages of the value chain, they are priced into the end product. The costs should be allocated in such a way that they cause the least distortion, e.g. through levies for end consumers or taxes. The aim should also be to select the most efficient instruments that cause the lowest costs (see, for example, the comments on fill level requirements above).

C. Other

94 Do you have anything to add with regard to the general operation and/or future development of the Regulation on the security of gas supply?

The general principle of the Gas SoS Regulation should continue to be to facilitate co-operation rather than to prescribe detailed solutions.

5. Specific questions on the security of electricity supply

Interconnected and coupled electricity markets and systems require closer co-operation between EU Member States to prevent and manage electricity supply crises. The EU has introduced a regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and, in the spirit of

solidarity and transparency, has created several instruments to prevent, prepare for, and manage electricity supply crises.

Article 18 of the Regulation requires the European Commission to submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Regulation by 1 September 2025. This public consultation will not only feed into the fitness check of the security of energy supply framework, but also into this report. The EU security of electricity supply framework is complemented by other administrative provisions that should be given particular attention in the assessment of the consistency criteria. These include the Guideline on Transmission System Operation established by Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 and the Network Code on Emergency and Restoration under Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2196, as well as Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directive (EU) 2019/944 on the internal market in electricity.

A. Review

1. Effectiveness

95 According to the 2016 impact assessment accompanying the Commission's proposal for a Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector, the new Regulation pursues several specific objectives. How do you rate its performance in relation to the following aspects?

	1 (Very bad)	2 (Bad)	3 (Average)	4 (Good)	5 (Excellent)
a) Improving prevention and screening	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b) Improving transparency and the exchange of information	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c) Improving coordination in electricity supply crises	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d) Reducing the risk of negative spill-over effects that purely national measures could have in neighbouring Member States.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

96 Have there been any unexpected and/or unintended consequences of the implementation of this Regulation that have hindered the realisation of these objectives?

Yes

No

97 What were the effects and which provisions of the regulation caused these effects?

98 How would you rate the effectiveness of certain specific provisions in ensuring preparedness, security of supply and/or resilience?

	1 (Completely ineffective)	2 (Hardly effective)	3 (Conditionally effective)	4 (Effective)	5 (Very effective)
Regional risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	Click or tap here to enter text. <input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk assessments in relation to the ownership structure of the infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Seasonal and short-term adequacy studies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk provisioning plans in relation to national measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk provisioning plans in relation to regional and bilateral measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Early warning and explanation of a power supply crisis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Users who can claim special protection from disconnection from the grid for reasons of public and personal safety	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cooperation and support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

New tasks assigned to the Electricity Coordination Group by the Regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Establishment of a competent authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regional emergency tests	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

99 Would you like to elaborate on one or more of the above points? If yes, please indicate which points you are referring to.

The definition of electricity price crises depends on the country and is therefore not easily comparable. National structures and natural conditions (see topography, weather conditions, seasonal dependencies, etc.) also play a decisive role and must be considered.

100 Do you consider that the framework for co-operation and support under Article 15 of the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation is effective enough to deal with regional crises?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

101 Can you provide more details? What possibilities for improvement are there?

In principle, the regulations are satisfactory. However, there is room for improvement in harmonising the requirements, e.g. by drawing up more generally applicable regulations.

2. efficiency

102 What were the costs and benefits of implementing this regulation in your organisation? If possible, please indicate both quantitative and qualitative aspects and make specific reference to the costs associated with the development of the risk provisioning plans.

The ENTSO-E groups for the exchange of information should be mentioned here. The costs are acceptable for large companies but are relatively higher for smaller companies.

103 To what extent have the following provisions caused a disproportionate effort (e.g. administrative, financial or other burdens)?

	1	2	3	4	5
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	(Negligible)	(Hardly)	(Average)	(Stark)	(Very strong)
Regional risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National risk assessments	<input type="checkbox"/>	Click or tap here to enter text. <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk assessments in relation to the ownership structure of the infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Seasonal and short-term adequacy studies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk provisioning plans in relation to national measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk provisioning plans in relation to regional and bilateral measures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Early warning and explanation of a power supply crisis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Users who can claim special protection from disconnection from the grid for reasons of public and personal safety	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cooperation and support	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
New tasks assigned to the Electricity Coordination Group by the Regulation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Establishment of a competent authority	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Regional emergency tests	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

104 Would you like to elaborate on one or more of the above points? If yes, please indicate which points you are referring to.

This varies greatly from company to company.

105 How timely (e.g. in terms of updating every four years) and efficient is the administrative procedure for risk preparation plans?

4 years is fine.

106 Can you please explain your categorisation in more detail?

107 Are there aspects of the risk provisioning plan management process that could be streamlined or improved?

Yes

No

No opinion

108 Can you provide more details?

It should be possible to take a differentiated view of the scenarios. In addition, a lead time of 6 months is very short for calculating the scenarios.

The regulation should be adapted to provide the same procedural requirements (method of calculation, programmes to be used) with further risk analyses (e.g. ERA) .

3. Relevance

109 To what extent have the provisions of the Electricity Risk Preparedness Regulation been relevant in addressing the electricity supply challenges that the EU has experienced since its implementation? Please explain your answer with specific reference to the recent crises (i.e. the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy crisis of 2022 and 2023)

110 To what extent could the risk prevention plans be effective in averting, preventing, managing and mitigating actual electricity supply crises? What could be improved?

111 How suitable is the regulation on risk prevention in the electricity sector for technological or scientific progress and for the environmental/climate-related challenges facing the EU?

4. coherence

112 To what extent is the regulation on risk prevention in the electricity sector harmonised with other EU policy objectives?

113 Are there any inconsistencies with other EU regulations?

Yes

No

No opinion

114 Which EU regulations are involved?

115 Have some provisions in the regulation proven to be incompatible?

Yes

No

No opinion

116 Please give specific examples:

Greater consistency in the definition of electricity crises - both from a regional and national perspective.

5 European added value

117 What is the added value of EU action for the EU's security of electricity supply compared to what could realistically (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) have been achieved by Member States at national level?

In particular, the exchange in the ENTSO-E working groups works well.

B. Outlook

118 How can both the process and the content of the risk-preparedness plans be improved in the light of Member States' recent experience in developing them?

It is unclear what information is for the public and to what extent internal processes are affected. It is necessary to provide information about the assessment methodology in the analyses carried out: Which risk assessments were modelled, and which were merely estimated?

119 To what extent is the Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector still relevant given the evolution of the threat landscape and the development of electricity supply in the EU and the EU energy mix as a whole? Are there any objectives that were not addressed in 2017 or gaps that should be addressed by a revision of the Regulation?

120 Do you think that the definition of the term "electricity supply crisis" should be standardised in all Member States or at least be based on common criteria?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

121 If so, on what criteria should it be based?

A European framework would be necessary here to make definitions comparable. One possibility here would be the criteria from the electricity market design.

122 Do you think the definition of regions in Article 2 of the Regulation should be amended?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

123 If so, on what criteria should it be based?

C. Other

124 Do you have anything to add with regard to the general operation and/or future development of the regulation on risk provisioning in the electricity sector?

The extent of climate risks, in particular the impact of extreme weather events such as heat waves, droughts, and damage to energy infrastructure due to storms, should be given greater consideration.

Take extreme weather events, for example: These are short-term events that offer little or no response time for damage limitation. In the event of extreme heat, heavy rainfall, thunderstorms or strong winds, for example, the energy infrastructure can be so badly damaged that only curative measures - such as restoring the grid - are possible afterwards. Severe flooding, forest fires, broken transmission pylons and infrastructure outages can be the result of such extreme weather events. As these events can disrupt energy supply and infrastructure without warning, the current framework lacks adequate mechanisms to prevent or adapt in real time.
